Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth

DOI10.1007/s10992-018-9474-1zbMath1457.03020OpenAlexW2886265244MaRDI QIDQ2000672

Edoardo Rivello

Publication date: 28 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9474-1

zbMATH Keywords

self-referential truthsupervaluationrevision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (2)

Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach ⋮ Revision without revision sequences: circular definitions

Cites Work

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• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• SUPERVALUATION ON TREES FOR KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH
• AXIOMATIZING SEMANTIC THEORIES OF TRUTH?
• Axiomatizing Kripke's theory of truth
• Revision Forever!
• Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth

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