Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
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Publication:2002058
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1zbMath1417.91382OpenAlexW2177867462WikidataQ129893784 ScholiaQ129893784MaRDI QIDQ2002058
Publication date: 11 July 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/248696378/Compromises_and_Rewards_stable_and_non_manipulable_probabilistic_matching.pdf
Related Items (3)
Stable fractional matchings ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
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