Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0634-XzbMath1417.91079OpenAlexW2808837421WikidataQ129653284 ScholiaQ129653284MaRDI QIDQ2002062

O. V. Baskov

Publication date: 11 July 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0634-x

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamesrepeated gamesfinite automatamatrix games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Bounded computational capacity equilibrium
• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with finite automata
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

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