Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
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Publication:2002068
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0641-yzbMath1417.91255OpenAlexW2895116419MaRDI QIDQ2002068
Tomoya Tajika, Tomoya Kazumura
Publication date: 11 July 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0641-y
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