Limited focus in dynamic games
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Publication:2002069
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0642-xzbMath1417.91125OpenAlexW2895283263MaRDI QIDQ2002069
Publication date: 11 July 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0642-x
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