Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0649-3zbMath1417.91386OpenAlexW3122173739MaRDI QIDQ2002070

Martin Van der Linden

Publication date: 11 July 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-16-00019.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessstabilitymatchingmanipulabilitydeferred acceptance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Manipulability in school choice

Cites Work

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