Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
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Publication:2002070
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0649-3zbMath1417.91386OpenAlexW3122173739MaRDI QIDQ2002070
Publication date: 11 July 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-16-00019.pdf
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