On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
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Publication:2002071
DOI10.1007/s00182-018-0650-xzbMath1417.91188OpenAlexW2901283884WikidataQ128902444 ScholiaQ128902444MaRDI QIDQ2002071
Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague, Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack
Publication date: 11 July 2019
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0650-x
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Cites Work
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