Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference

DOI10.1007/s00182-018-00656-yzbMath1417.91089OpenAlexW2906957784MaRDI QIDQ2002074

Alice Peng-Ju Su

Publication date: 11 July 2019

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-00656-y

zbMATH Keywords

collusionimperfect monitoringrelative performance evaluationteam incentivejoint performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method

Cites Work

• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams

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