On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.015zbMath1417.91127OpenAlexW2936516699WikidataQ128086936 ScholiaQ128086936MaRDI QIDQ2002344

Michael Trost

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www2.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2014/wp_2014_032.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic game theorycommon beliefchoice ruleiterative deletion procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

Choice structures in games

Cites Work

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