Strategic voting when participation is costly

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.010zbMath1417.91189OpenAlexW2914771376MaRDI QIDQ2002354

Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/12-18.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

plurality rulestrategic votingcostly votingDuverger's lawmultiparty elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Coordinated democracy ⋮ Electoral turnout with divided opposition ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

Cites Work

• Welfare reducing polls
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Large Poisson games
• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

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