Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
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Publication:2002360
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.05.001zbMath1417.91103OpenAlexW2944195505MaRDI QIDQ2002360
Heinrich H. Nax, Jonathan Newton
Publication date: 12 July 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.001
Related Items (4)
Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule ⋮ Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection
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