Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.05.001zbMath1417.91103OpenAlexW2944195505MaRDI QIDQ2002360

Heinrich H. Nax, Jonathan Newton

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionevolutionrisk attitudesstate dependenceconcave utilityconventions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule ⋮ Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection

Cites Work

• An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
• Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics
• Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• How noise matters.
• Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
• Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
• Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
• The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
• Rapid evolution under inertia
• SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS
• The Effect of Changes in Risk Attitude on Strategic Behavior
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

This page was built for publication: Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run