Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002zbMath1417.91187OpenAlexW3122886876WikidataQ128559111 ScholiaQ128559111MaRDI QIDQ2002366

Jean-Robert Tyran, Lydia Mechtenberg

Publication date: 12 July 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2016/1613.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentvotinginformation acquisitioninformation aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Why votes have value: instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Voting to Tell Others
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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