Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly
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Publication:2002368
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.005zbMath1417.91349OpenAlexW2947464075WikidataQ127805026 ScholiaQ127805026MaRDI QIDQ2002368
Jaideep Roy, Randy Silvers, Ching-Jen Sun
Publication date: 12 July 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.005
Cournot oligopolyCondorcet winnerconflictcollective Bayesian persuasionmajoritarian preferenceprecision of public informationuncertain costs
Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
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