How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2007792
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2018.08.050zbMath1429.91041OpenAlexW2892834748MaRDI QIDQ2007792
Publication date: 22 November 2019
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.08.050
persistenceiterated prisoner's dilemmaimperfect informationmemory costswitching costpayoff non-linearity
Related Items
Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game ⋮ The interplay of behaviors and attitudes in public goods game considering environmental investment ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
- Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
- Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
- Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- Games among relatives revisited
- Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions
- Impact of individual response strategy on the spatial public goods game within mobile agents
- Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
- Darwinian selection and altruism
- Models of the evolution of altruism
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
- Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Automata, repeated games and noise
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
- Limitations of inclusive fitness
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- The Calculus of Selfishness
