Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2018.12.043zbMath1429.91050OpenAlexW2909864889WikidataQ128592129 ScholiaQ128592129MaRDI QIDQ2009251

Shun Kurokawa, Yi Tao, Xiu-Deng Zheng

Publication date: 27 November 2019

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.12.043

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option

Cites Work

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• Active linking in evolutionary games
• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

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