Popularity-driven strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:2010726
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2019.01.060zbMath1429.91061OpenAlexW2916141920WikidataQ128351080 ScholiaQ128351080MaRDI QIDQ2010726
Mingyu Gao, Qun Song, Qiuling Wang, Zhihong Tian, Bo Gao, Zhenxi Niu, Ji-Wei Xu, Zheng-hong Deng
Publication date: 27 November 2019
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.01.060
Related Items (3)
Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity ⋮ Uneven resources network promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Cites Work
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Reputation-based coevolution of link weights promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolution of cooperation mediated by limiting resources: connecting resource based models and evolutionary game theory
- Environment promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial voluntary prisoner's dilemma game
- Coevolution of multi-game resolves social dilemma in network population
- A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- Influence of bolstering network reciprocity in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game: a perspective
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