On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies

DOI10.1007/s11238-019-09720-9zbMath1428.91012OpenAlexW2613495040MaRDI QIDQ2011371

Aymeric Lardon

Publication date: 6 December 2019

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09720-9

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcoreBertrandCournotcarteldifferentiated oligopolyaggregate-monotonic core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Stable allocations for choice-based collaborative price setting

Cites Work

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