Evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts

DOI10.1155/2017/9271651zbMath1367.93053DBLPjournals/complexity/Kim17OpenAlexW2572629614WikidataQ59142962 ScholiaQ59142962MaRDI QIDQ2012861

Pilwon Kim

Publication date: 3 August 2017

Published in: Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/9271651

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationpopulation modelgroup-group conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites Work

• Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
• Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: The Public Goods game
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Scale-Free Networks
• A theory of group selection.
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

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