Consistency and its converse for roommate markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.002zbMath1393.91120OpenAlexW2595959398MaRDI QIDQ2013333

Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

coreconverse consistencymarriage and roommate markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach ⋮ A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem ⋮ Consistency and its converse for roommate markets ⋮ Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form

Cites Work

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• Impossibilities for roommate problems
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• Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
• Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
• Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets
• Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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