Bargaining in dynamic markets
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Publication:2013334
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.014zbMath1393.91090OpenAlexW2604084754MaRDI QIDQ2013334
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.014
multiplicitybargainingequilibrium existencerandom matchingdecentralized non-stationary marketsiterated conditional dominance
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (4)
Price dispersion in stationary networked markets ⋮ Bargaining in small dynamic markets ⋮ A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model ⋮ Steady states in matching and bargaining
Cites Work
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- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
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