Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
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Publication:2013335
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.005zbMath1393.91089OpenAlexW2598467885MaRDI QIDQ2013335
Jingfeng Lu, Sérgio O. Parreiras
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (8)
All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor ⋮ On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest ⋮ The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security ⋮ All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals ⋮ A simple model of competition between teams
Cites Work
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- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
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- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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