Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.007zbMath1393.91070OpenAlexW3124324778MaRDI QIDQ2013338

Daniel Martin

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

rational inattentionlimited attentionprice signalingstrategic naïveté

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (8)

Paying for inattention ⋮ Misperception and cognition in markets ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough ⋮ Logit, CES, and rational inattention ⋮ Value computation and modulation: a neuroeconomic theory of self-control as constrained optimization ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Persuasion with limited communication capacity

Cites Work

• Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Business Cycle Dynamics under Rational Inattention
• Endogenous Depth of Reasoning
• Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision-Making
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *
• Cursed Equilibrium

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