Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.006zbMath1393.91025OpenAlexW2581684512MaRDI QIDQ2013341

Yair Tauman, Artyom Jelnov, Richard J. Zeckhauser

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

deterrenceincomplete informationintelligence systempooling and separating equilibriaweapons of mass destruction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game ⋮ Monitoring innovation ⋮ Deterrence games and the disruption of information ⋮ Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality

Cites Work

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• On the value of information in a strategic conflict
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3
• Bargaining in the shadow of power

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