Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001zbMath1393.91121OpenAlexW2402479472MaRDI QIDQ2013343

Flip Klijn, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hec.unil.ch/attachments/deep/series/2016/16.07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingimplementationmechanismssubstitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets

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