Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
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Publication:2013344
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.003zbMath1393.91122OpenAlexW2606966434MaRDI QIDQ2013344
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.003
Related Items (2)
Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
Cites Work
- Constrained school choice
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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