A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.009zbMath1393.91017OpenAlexW2612352712MaRDI QIDQ2013350

Souvik Roy, Andrés Perea

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationepistemic game theoryproper rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information

Cites Work

• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• On solutions of Bayesian games
• Topology-free typology of beliefs
• Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
• Proper rationalizability and backward induction
• On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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