Optimal dynamic information provision

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.010zbMath1393.91110arXiv1407.5649OpenAlexW1596703369MaRDI QIDQ2013351

Eilon Solan, Jérôme Renault, Nicolas Vieille

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.5649

zbMATH Keywords

optimal strategygreedy algorithmcommitmentdynamic information provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (16)

Dynamic persuasion ⋮ Effects of investors' power correlations in the power-based game on networks ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ The secretary recommendation problem ⋮ Slow persuasion ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Paying with information ⋮ Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Sequential Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side ⋮ Markovian persuasion with two states ⋮ Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games ⋮ Information design in multistage games ⋮ Evolutionary investor sharing game on networks ⋮ Evolutionary investors' power-based game on networks ⋮ Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamic persuasion
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
• On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• The Value of Markov Chain Games with Lack of Information on One Side
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?
• A first course on zero-sum repeated games

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