Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
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Publication:2013352
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012zbMath1393.91056OpenAlexW2567912903MaRDI QIDQ2013352
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012
Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (6)
Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Condorcet meets Bentham ⋮ Random assignments and outside options
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