Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003zbMath1393.91051OpenAlexW2605285875MaRDI QIDQ2013360

Justin Valasek, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, Rune Midjord

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

committeesinformation aggregationdisesteem payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model ⋮ When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives ⋮ Voting on tricky questions ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

Cites Work

• Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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