Efficient voting with penalties
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Publication:2013363
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.006zbMath1393.91049OpenAlexW792309963MaRDI QIDQ2013363
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/411135/1/Eff_vot_somenotes_17_clean_with_keywords.pdf
Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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Cites Work
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