Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.007zbMath1393.91046OpenAlexW2620529423MaRDI QIDQ2013365

Peter Buisseret

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

run-offentry deterrenceelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Cites Work

• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
• Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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