Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.003zbMath1393.91042OpenAlexW2540676725MaRDI QIDQ2013370

Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2197

zbMATH Keywords

revealed preferencerationalizabilityrandom choicestochastic preferencebackwards-induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (2)

Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set ⋮ Frame-based stochastic choice rule

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
• Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

This page was built for publication: Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable