Test design under voluntary participation
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Publication:2013374
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.002zbMath1393.91024OpenAlexW2701203531MaRDI QIDQ2013374
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.002
Bayesian learningasymmetric informationconcavificationvoluntary participationfalse positivetest design
Related Items (6)
Slow persuasion ⋮ Informative tests in signaling environments ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ On the value of persuasion by experts ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
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