Test design under voluntary participation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.002zbMath1393.91024OpenAlexW2701203531MaRDI QIDQ2013374

Frank Rosar

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningasymmetric informationconcavificationvoluntary participationfalse positivetest design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Slow persuasion ⋮ Informative tests in signaling environments ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ On the value of persuasion by experts ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation ⋮ Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion

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