Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
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Publication:2013378
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.010zbMath1393.91003OpenAlexW2257248950MaRDI QIDQ2013378
Philipp Strack, Daniel Müller, Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112947
Related Items (6)
Expectations-based loss aversion in contests ⋮ Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms ⋮ English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders ⋮ Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players ⋮ Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
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