The management of innovation: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011zbMath1393.91104OpenAlexW3123712006WikidataQ57381956 ScholiaQ57381956MaRDI QIDQ2013380

David J. Kusterer, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractslaboratory experimentsproperty rightsinvestment incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• oTree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Investments as signals of outside options
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• The Management of Innovation
• Promises and Partnership

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