``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.013zbMath1393.91018OpenAlexW3122466578WikidataQ59200812 ScholiaQ59200812MaRDI QIDQ2013382

Drew Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber, Antonio A. Arechar

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124530

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamescooperationprisoner's dilemmaintentions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks ⋮ Examining spillovers between long and short repeated prisoner's dilemma games played in the laboratory ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Bare promises: an experiment
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*

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