Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
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Publication:2013383
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.014zbMath1393.91002OpenAlexW3124082060MaRDI QIDQ2013383
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2066.pdf
incomplete informationBayes correlated equilibriumbelief-free rationalizabilityinformational robustnessinterim correlated rationalizability
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