Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.027zbMath1368.92209OpenAlexW2564379877WikidataQ89437690 ScholiaQ89437690MaRDI QIDQ2013424

Hirofumi Takesue

Publication date: 18 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.027

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessbargainingagent-based modelingNash demand game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (1)

Evolution of conditional and unconditional commitment

Cites Work

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