Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents
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Publication:2014050
DOI10.1007/s40305-016-0117-3zbMath1368.91119OpenAlexW2283051029MaRDI QIDQ2014050
Publication date: 10 August 2017
Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-016-0117-3
Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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