Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9335-2zbMath1290.91047OpenAlexW2012764330MaRDI QIDQ2015024

Mathieu Lefebvre, Ferdinand M. Vieider

Publication date: 18 June 2014

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/130578

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesrisk-takingaccountabilityexecutive compensationstock options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Related Items (3)

It's about how the task is set: the inclusion-exclusion effect and accountability in preprocessing management information ⋮ Good decision vs. good results: outcome bias in the evaluation of financial agents ⋮ Losing funds or losing face? Reputation and accountability in the credit rating industry

Uses Software

• ORSEE

Cites Work

• What is loss aversion?
• A tractable method to measure utility and loss aversion under prospect theory
• Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
• A new solution for a partially penetrating constant-rate pumping well with a finite-thickness skin

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