Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
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Publication:2015027
DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9zbMath1290.91056OpenAlexW2109579158MaRDI QIDQ2015027
Publication date: 18 June 2014
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9352-9
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