Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
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Publication:2015028
DOI10.1007/s11238-013-9358-3zbMath1290.91057OpenAlexW2045860333MaRDI QIDQ2015028
Publication date: 18 June 2014
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9358-3
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Cites Work
- Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules
- Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
- A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Voting paradoxes and referenda
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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