Manipulating games by sharing information

DOI10.1007/s11225-014-9544-5zbMath1329.91007OpenAlexW1976853346MaRDI QIDQ2016078

Michael Wooldridge, Sarit Kraus, Inon Zuckerman, J. R. Grant

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-014-9544-5

zbMATH Keywords

communicationNash equilibriumBoolean gamesannouncement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Classical propositional logic (03B05)

Related Items (2)

From model checking to equilibrium checking: reactive modules for rational verification ⋮ Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games

Cites Work

• Incentive engineering for Boolean games
• Dependencies between players in Boolean games
• STRIPS: A new approach to the application of theorem proving to problem solving
• Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Knowledge Puzzles
• The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
• An axiomatic basis for computer programming
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