A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007zbMath1296.91019OpenAlexW1963975312MaRDI QIDQ2016219

Katsuhiko Aiba

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamefolk theoremdiscounted payoffalmost-perfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Stochastic Games

Cites Work

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• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Noncooperative Stochastic Games

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