Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
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Publication:2016225
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.008zbMath1290.91026OpenAlexW2141310328MaRDI QIDQ2016225
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.008
type spacesepistemic game theorycommon strong beliefcommon assumptionconditional belief hierarchiesepistemic equivalencelexicographic belief hierarchies
Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (4)
Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ UNIVERSALLY RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES ⋮ Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
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