Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.013zbMath1296.91177OpenAlexW2092796860MaRDI QIDQ2016226

David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro, Inés Macho-Stadler

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171306

zbMATH Keywords

matchingassignmentmoral hazardcontracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Bidding for incentive contracts, Participation in moral hazard problems, EXPLAINING THE SPREAD OF TEMPORARY JOBS AND ITS IMPACT ON LABOR TURNOVER

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