Random dictatorship domains
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Publication:2016232
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017zbMath1296.91098OpenAlexW2141503757MaRDI QIDQ2016232
Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1400
Related Items (16)
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system ⋮ Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains ⋮ On single-peaked domains and min-max rules ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains ⋮ Decomposing random mechanisms ⋮ Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules ⋮ A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
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