Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.014zbMath1296.91131OpenAlexW2133410115MaRDI QIDQ2016235

Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Mark Allen Satterthwaite

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

double auctioncorrelated valuesdesigned mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade

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