Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2016235
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.014zbMath1296.91131OpenAlexW2133410115MaRDI QIDQ2016235
Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.014
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Empirical implementation of nonparametric first-price auction models
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Continuity in auction design
- A dominant strategy double auction
- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
- Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- The modified Vickrey double auction
- Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctions With Correlated Private Values
- Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
- Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Robust Mechanism Design
- The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism
This page was built for publication: Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
