Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.010zbMath1296.91226OpenAlexW2119790577MaRDI QIDQ2016239

Humberto Moreira, Rafael Costa Lima

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommon agencypolitical economylobby

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Mathematical economics (91B99) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals ⋮ Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?

Cites Work

• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• A Model of Expertise
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information

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