The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.007zbMath1296.91132OpenAlexW3125388682MaRDI QIDQ2016242

Christian Seel

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79930

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationall-pay contestshead start

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints ⋮ Designing Dynamic Contests ⋮ On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions ⋮ A tug-of-war team contest ⋮ DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY ⋮ Gambling in contests with random initial law

Cites Work

• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

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